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Abstract—Although almost all information about Smart Con-
tract addresses is shared via websites, emails, or other forms
of digital communication, Blockchains and distributed ledger
technology are unable to establish secure bindings between
websites and corresponding Smart Contracts. For a user, it
is impossible to differentiate whether a website links to a
legitimate Smart Contract set up by owners of a business or
to an illicit contract aiming to steal users’ funds. Surpris-
ingly, current attempts to solve this issue mostly comprise of
information redundancy, e.g., displaying contract addresses
multiple times in varying forms of images and texts. These
processes are burdensome, as the user is responsible for
verifying the correctness of an address. More importantly,
they do not address the core issue, as the contract itself
does not contain information about its authenticity. To solve
current issues for these applications and increase security, we
propose a solution that facilitates publicly issued SSL/TLS-
certificates of Fully-Qualified Domain Names (FQDN) to
ensure the authenticity of Smart Contracts and their owners.
Our approach combines on-chain identity assertion utilizing
signatures from the respective certificate and off-chain au-
thentication of the Smart Contract stored on the Blockchain.
This approach allows to tackle the aforementioned issue and
further enables applications such as the identification of
consortia members in permissioned networks. The system
is open and transparent, as the only requirement for usage
is ownership of an SSL/TLS-certificate. To enable privacy-
preserving authenticated Smart Contracts, we allow one-way
and two-way binding between website and contract. Further,
low creation and maintenance costs, a widely accepted public
key infrastructure and user empowerment will drive poten-
tial adaption of Ethereum Authenticated Smart Contracts
(AuthSC).
Index Terms—blockchain, authentication, smart contracts,
ethereum, certificates
1. Introduction
Users in publicly available Blockchain-based systems
face a highly dangerous and hostile environment, as at-
tackers have high incentives to steal users’ funds. Al-
though the underlying ledger provides immutable Smart
Contracts, decentralized key management, and resistant
consensus mechanisms, fraud, hacks, impersonation, and
other malicious activities are to be encountered on a daily
basis. Resolving issues of Smart Contract engineering, the
formal verification of Contracts or the design of secure
programming languages are subject to active research.
However, an often ignored issue is the weak link to the in-
formation stored on Blockchains: The user needs to know
the exact location of the Smart Contract or the externally
owned account to interact with. As these addresses consist
of random characters, e.g., in Ethereum 64 hexadecimal
characters [1], users rely on the web and a clipboard to
copy and paste address information. The called address or
Smart Contract contains no further information to verify
whether the user interacts with the intended Contract or
not.
The approach of just sharing addresses on web pages
without any further connection between the business and
the Smart Contract is prone to errors and can be exploited
by attackers. The Coindash ICO is an example of such an
attack [2]. At the height of Token Sales in 2017, Coindash
conducted an Initial Coin Offering (ICO), selling their
newly created token to interested investors in return for
Ether (the currency of the Ethereum Blockchain). To
advertise their token sale, the founders set up a website.
The website contained all relevant information on how to
invest their company, including the address of the Smart
Contract. The sale started and many people participated;
several million USD were sent in the first few hours; un-
fortunately, not to the intended token Smart Contract, but
to a different Smart Contract set up by malicious actors,
collecting all the investment funds. These malicious actors
had previously hacked the website and quietly replaced the
original contract address with their own, resulting in the
loss of over 7 million USD. While the Wordpress content
management system was compromised, the underlying
web server remained intact.
To solve the issue of loose coupling between web-
site and Smart Contract, we propose Ethereum authenti-
cated Smart Contracts (AuthSC). AuthSC allows endors-
ing Smart Contracts with a private/public key pair of a
TLS-certificate issued by a certificate authority (CA). This
approach enables wallets or other software, which directly
interact with Smart Contracts, to verify their authenticity
and binding to the respective website.
AuthSC contains three crucial components: the au-
thenticated Smart Contract, which stores information
about the endorsement, an off-chain verifier, which au-
thenticates the Smart Contract as well as the AuthSC
registry, which prevents downgrade-attacks and offers a
discovery service.
Our approach considers privacy-preserving authenti-
cated Smart Contracts: Entities might decide to endorse
Smart Contracts, however, do not want other parties to
retrieve their endorsement by crawling the respective
Blockchain. We expand the system to allow for an explicit
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discovery of such contracts: In case the user journey is not
started at the website, but at the Smart Contract itself, the
user is still able to authenticate this Smart Contract. This
allows for varying applications, which we cover in Section
4. Furthermore, we discuss associated risks and potential
attacks and countermeasures.
To structure our work, we organize our paper as fol-
lows: In Section 2, we introduce the system architecture
and the methodologies to assert and authenticate Smart
Contracts. We discuss privacy, risks, and attacks in Section
3. Section 4 gives an overview of the applicability of the
proposed artifact. We discuss the limitations and advan-
tages of our approach in Section 5. We give an overview
of related work in Section 6 and end in Section 7 with a
conclusion and potential future work.
2. System Architecture
In this Section, we introduce the general approach and
give an overview of the architecture, the single compo-
nents, and the structure of the Smart Contracts. We further
display processes of the system and design considerations.
Our goal is to establish a binding between Smart Con-
tracts and websites using common SSL/TLS-certificates
which ensure the authenticity of web servers, the privacy,
and integrity of messages between browser and server.
The owner of a certificate endorses a Smart Contract by
signing the respective address and storing it within the
respective Smart Contract. Later, other parties can retrieve
the certificate from the Blockchain and validate it against
their trusted certificate authority servers, thereby authen-
ticating the contract. Afterward, they can engage with the
specific Smart Contract or further evaluate data stored
in the Smart Contract, aware of the actual identity of
the counterparty. A reference interface is available online
in [3], using Solidity for Ethereum. In theory, AuthSC
is Blockchain-independent; any other network can profit
from this methodology.
To enable identity assertion and authentication, our
system consists of three components:
• The On-Chain Authenticated Smart Contract
contains methods for storing and updating sig-
nature information. This functionality is provided
as a library and therefore independent from the
actual Smart Contract (e.g., token contract or other
purposes).
• The Off-Chain Verifier is an application that
runs outside of the Blockchain. It is responsible
for verifying on-chain assertions. It retrieves data
from the certificate issuer, the website owner, the
Blockchain, and potential certificate authorities.
With this information, it enables authentication of
on-chain information in the context of the user-
defined environment.
• The Authenticated Smart Contract Registry
prevents downgrade-attacks by providing a list of
Smart Contracts for domains. Further, it option-
ally allows for easy discovery of Smart Contracts
which implement this library. It manages a list
of existing Smart Contracts and their respective
domains such that interested parties can find these
Smart Contracts.
Figure 1 depicts the overall structure of the proposed
architecture. The On-Chain Authenticated Smart Contract
(AuthSC) is placed within the Blockchain system and
referred to by the Authenticated Smart Contract Registry.
The Off-Chain Verifier accesses the AuthSC, the DNS,
and the PKI to verify the correctness of all obtained data
and to authenticate the specific Smart Contract.
In the remainder of this Section, we analyze the
responsibilities and methodologies of the single compo-
nents.
2.1. On-Chain Authenticated Smart Contract
An entity asserts its identity to a Smart Contract by
binding it to a public domain. To allow such identity
assertion, the contract has to store the following data for
authentication:
• the fully qualified domain name for later identifi-
cation (optional)
• the signature information (the address of the Smart
Contract signed by the private key)
Additional information required for the authentication
of the Smart Contract is retrieved from external data
sources. This identity assertion functionality can be em-
bedded in an arbitrary Smart Contract, allowing AuthSC
to be used in any on-chain environment. The interface a
Smart Contract has to implement to adhere to AuthSC
is depicted in Listing 1. Please note that an FQDN is
provided as an array, e.g., hq.example.org translates to
["org", "example", "hq"]. This approach allows
for easy access to parts of the FQDN.
1 interface ERCXXX /* is ERC165 */{
2
3 // @dev Event is emitted when the FQDN
changes
4 event FQDNChanged(string[] indexed FQDN);
5
6 // @dev Event is emitted when the signature
changes
7 event SignatureChanged(string signature);
8
9 // @dev Returns the domain for the given SC
10 function getFQDN() external view returns (
string[] memory);
11
12 // @dev Returns the signature for the given
SC
13 function getSignature() external view
returns (string memory);
14
15 // @dev Allows to set the FQDN
16 function setFQDN(string[] calldata _FQDN)
external;
17
18 // @notice Sets the signature (containing
the SC address)
19 function setSignature(string calldata
_signature) external;
20 }
Listing 1. On-Chain Smart Contract Interface in Solidity
Three steps are required to enable authentication of
the Smart Contract: Smart Contract creation, signature
generation, and signature upload. For simplicity, we omit
intermediate or supporting activities such as creating wal-
let addresses, funding the accounts, and including the
library in the respective Smart Contract.
Figure 1. High-Level Structure.
1) Smart Contract Creation: As it is impossible to
update previously existing Smart Contracts, one
has to create a new Smart Contract upfront. A
contract has to be instantiated with information
on the address of the owner of the Smart Contract
and optionally the domain to which the owner has
access to (e.g., the domain or any subdomain). If
a domain is not provided, two-way binding is not
supported, which we discuss in Section 3.
After the first step, the Smart Contract is set up
on the Blockchain.
2) Signature Generation: The signature is still
missing in the Smart Contract and thus, the SS-
L/TLS certificate has not endorsed this Smart
Contract, as any party can execute the first step
for any domain. The entity retrieves the unique
contract address and signs this string with its
private key of the SSL/TLS-certificate. As the
signature contains only one specific Smart Con-
tract address, other Smart Contracts cannot use
this information to pretend to be also endorsed
by this domain.
3) Signature Upload: The signature created in the
previous step is transmitted to the Smart Con-
tract as part of a regular transaction calling the
method setSignature. The contract validates
that the transaction is indeed created by the orig-
inal owner of the Smart Contract, as the contract
itself is not able to verify if the provided data is
correct. If the owner issued the transaction, the
payload is stored in the respective field of the
Smart Contract, awaiting later retrieval.
It is possible to reduce the process to two steps, as it is
possible to sign the address of the contract before its ini-
tialization, providing the signature alongside the domain
name. This is possible as the addresses of to-be generated
Smart Contracts are deterministic. For simplicity and to
remove possible interference with other transactions is-
sued from the same address, we decided to first upload
the contract and then actually submit the signature data,
preventing that an incorrect address is signed.
2.2. Off-Chain Verifier
Smart Contract computations must be deterministic.
Thus, a Smart Contract cannot request external data like
lists of CAs or web servers, as a recurring calculation
(e.g., in another full node in the network) might lead to
a different result. Therefore, we move the authentication
process of the endorsement stored within a Smart Contract
off-chain. The software itself needs to access the following
data sources:
• The address of the relevant Smart Contract, which
is obtained via the web or is obtained by the Au-
thenticated Smart Contract Registry or proprietary
discovery services.
• The contents of this Smart Contract, e.g., option-
ally the domain name and the signature
• The signed certificate, its public key alongside
the information of the certificate authority, ob-
tained by requesting the domain and retrieving the
SSL/TLS-certificate
• The list of trusted CAs of the user
It is possible to store the entire SSL/TLS-certificate in
the Blockchain, rendering the request to the web server
unnecessary. However, as these certificates take additional
space, we oppose to storing them on-chain for cost rea-
sons. If decentralized storage systems such as the Inter-
planetary File System (IPFS) [4] gain practical relevance,
it becomes cost-efficient to store complete certificates in
decentralized systems, no longer relying on web servers
of the respective owners. As long as such systems remain
in an early stage, we continue to request the certificate
from the respective servers.
The list of trusted certificate authorities is defined by
the user, either directly by providing a list themselves or
by the certificate authority list stored in her/his computer
or browser.
Smart Contract authentication involves four steps.
Again, we omit intermediate steps and assume a fully ac-
cessible system, also we assume that the contract address
is known.
1) Smart Contract Information Retrieval: The
application first retrieves all relevant information
for later authentication. It collects the domain and
signature data from the Smart Contract.
2) Certificate Retrieval: Afterwards, it connects to
the respective domain given in the Smart Contract
(or previously known by the website) and obtains
the certificate.
3) Smart Contract Signature Verification: The
software validates if the Smart Contract address
is signed by the private key of the certificate. As
the certificate has to belong to the website, no
additional check is required. If the signature is
correct, the software proceeds with step 4, other-
wise it aborts the identity authentication with an
error.
4) Certificate trust: After the successful verifica-
tion of the signature, the software checks whether
a trusted certificate authority has (indirectly)
signed or issued the certificate found in the Smart
Contract and the web server. If the certificate and
its public key is signed by a trusted CA, then
the identity is successfully validated, otherwise,
the program aborts with an error. It executes the
certification path validation algorithm as defined
in RFC 5280 [5].
Figure 2 depicts the steps involved in the authentica-
tion process in detail. The definitions for digital signature
methods are well established [3]. For this algorithm, we
assume that the Smart Contract address is previously
known.
2.3. Authenticated Smart Contract Registry
The previously described on-chain architecture is com-
prised of a single type of Smart Contract. A set of
such Smart Contracts is sufficient to create and manage
identities. However, it is relevant to know 1) whether a
contract exists for a given domain and 2) under which
address it is deployed. To find such contracts or check
if contracts exist, we propose extending this architecture
by introducing an Authenticated Smart Contract Registry,
which allows to quickly lookup all domains registered
on the Blockchain. This registry lists all contracts which
adhere to this interface standard and claim to be the
identity contract for a specific domain. We need to modify
such a registry for two reasons: 1) Our on-chain data does
not converge to a single truth, but allows creating different
perceptions of reality. 2) A company can decide to offer
multiple Smart Contracts, providing various services, with
their identity tied to them. We, thus, allow that multiple
Authenticated Smart Contracts can exist for the same
domain. Even though it is possible to search the complete
Blockchain for such contracts [3] [6], it is easier and faster
to use an on-chain Smart Contract.
The registry Smart Contract is in place to map domains
to Smart Contract addresses by a) storing SHA3-hashes of
domains with respective Smart Contracts and b) domains
with respective Smart Contracts for reasons we discuss in
Section 3. The usage of such contract is as follows.
1) Insertion of Contract Information: All parties
controlling authenticated Smart Contracts submit
information about their contract and optionally
the respective domain to the discovery service
Smart Contract.
2) Domain Lookup: If a user searches for a do-
main, s/he queries the registry Smart Contract and
asks for all contracts which are assigned to that
specific domain or the hash of that domain. The
contract returns all relevant contract addresses.
3) Contract authentication: The client can execute
the previously described authentication method
for each of the returned contracts, ensuring that
the correct Smart Contract, if it exists, is found.
This Registry Smart Contract relies on owners sub-
mitting their created contracts. Thus, 1) ideally every
authenticated contract is added and 2) the amount of
incorrect data is minimized. First, the entities creating
contracts have a strong incentive to be found, as they
want users and other parties to interact with their Smart
Contract, otherwise they would not have deployed it on
the Blockchain. The discovery service Smart Contract
allows them to advertise their service and enable users to
find them. Second, malicious entities which do not own
the respective TLS/SSL-certificate are discouraged from
linking respective contracts as it costs money to add the
information, the authentication of these contracts will fail
and the users will not even notice the existence of such
contracts, as modern computation power is sufficient to
process hundreds of such contracts in milliseconds. Given
this (dis)incentive structure, we allow every entity in the
network to add data to the Authenticated Smart Contract
Registry.
3. Privacy Concerns, Risks and Attacks
In this Section we discuss privacy considerations, one-
way and two-way bindings, key management risks and
downgrade-attacks on AuthSC.
3.1. Privacy Considerations
The design goal of open and transparent Blockchains
are inherently contrary to the goal of privacy of user
activity in such networks, as all transactions, messages and
deployed code is available to every node in the system. We
are aware that it is possible to crawl all Smart Contracts
stored in a Blockchain and also identify Authenticated
Smart Contracts. We acknowledge that some parties might
want to use the functionality provided by AuthSC, but do
not want to publicly state that this is the case. For that, we
introduce one-way and two-way binding between FQDN
and Smart Contract.
• One-way binding means that only the website
links to the Smart Contract; the contract itself does
not link to the website. Without knowledge about
Verifier v Smart Contract sc www
getFQDN()
return domain
getSignature()
return signature
Step 1 Verifier fetches data from sc
getCertificate(domain)
return certificate
Step 2 Verifier retrieves certificate from domain
verify(certificate.pk, sc.address, sc.signature)
return result
Step 3 Verifier checks signature
certificatePathValidation(certificate, rootCAList)
return result
Step 4 Verifier checks if certificate was signed (indirectly) by trusted CAs
Figure 2. Authentication of a Smart Contract attributed identity
the domain, the Smart Contract itself cannot be
authenticated, because it is unclear against which
domain it should be authenticated. This allows for
a privacy-preserving authenticated Smart Contract,
resulting in a contract that is findable on-chain,
however, cannot be attributed to a domain (and
therefore an owner). To enable one-way binding,
the Smart Contract itself does not store the domain
information. Nonetheless, to prevent downgrade-
attacks, it is recommended to store the address and
the hash of the domain within the registry Smart
Contract as outlined in Section 3.3.
• Two-way binding results in Smart Contracts which
can be authenticated by only knowing the re-
spective Smart Contract address. In this case, the
Smart Contract stores the FQDN within the Smart
Contract, allowing to resolve the certificate which
signed the Smart Contract address. In this case, it
is also advised to store the hash of the domain (to
prevent downgrade-attacks) as well as the domain
itself (to enable discovery) within the Authenti-
cated Smart Contract registry.
3.2. Key Management Risks
The key material in TLS/SSL-certificates faces the
following risks:
• Key Material Expiration: Key material in X.509
certificates expires regularly. Public key and signa-
ture information have to be updated, otherwise, the
verifying entity cannot assert the correctness of the
authenticated contract. To update the Smart Con-
tract, steps 2 and 3 of the assertion process have
to be executed again with the new certificate. This
procedure ensures that the previously submitted
information stored in the contract remains valid. If
an entity wants to invalidate her/his contract, s/he
updates the respective SSL/TLS-certificate, thus
invalidating the signature stored in the contract.
• Certificate Key Revocation: Key revocation be-
comes mandatory if key material gets compro-
mised. Such key material could be used to create
authenticated Smart Contracts, potentially tricking
users into believing that the new Smart Contract
does indeed belong to the compromised entity.
However, as our approach relies on the public key
of the web server, an replacement of the keys
stored on the server will also render potential
deceiving Smart Contracts invalid. The software
is not able to verify Smart Contracts with old
keys. Further, the software could also evaluate
whether the to-be verified certificates are included
in so-called certificate revocation lists (CRL). This
becomes relevant when the complete credential is
stored on-chain, as the additional check with the
web server is omitted.
3.3. Downgrade-Attacks
We found that AuthSC might be vulnerable to
downgrade-attacks.
In a downgrade-attack, an adversary tricks a party in a
communication protocol to assume that the other party is
incapable of adhering to newer (and more secure) versions
of the communication protocol, leading to the usage of
an older (and less secure) version of the protocol. As
an older version is susceptible to further attacks or has
no protection at all (e.g., plain text), an adversary can
further exploit the communication. The same is also true
for AuthSC. Looking at the base case and our introductory
example of CoinDash, it becomes apparent that the user
needs to know that a website uses AuthSC to protect their
users from sending transactions to malicious contracts.
However, we cannot expect a user to know whether the
counterparty actually implements AuthSC and in case of
CoinDash, an address swap is still possible without any
further mechanisms in place.
Therefore, the Off-Chain Verifier (or other software
implementing the authentication mechanism) needs to
know whether a contract exists for a given domain. If
the verifier obtains a contract-address from a website, it
checks if this contract supports the AuthSC interface and,
if that is not the case, another Smart Contract exists for
that domain and further if that Smart Contract can be
verified. This verification is necessary to prevent Denial
of Service attacks, as otherwise attackers could register
Smart Contracts for any domain and harm the commu-
nication between the website and their users. If such a
contract is encountered without the current Smart Contract
adhering to the interface standard, a warning is emitted to
the user, stating that the current contract has no additional
protection against impersonation and that other contracts
with such protection exist.
The Authenticated Smart Contract Registry is asked
about already existing Smart Contracts for a domain. If
the original and authenticated Smart Contract is registered
within this registry, downgrade-attacks can be prevented.
4. Applicability
In this Section, we briefly introduce potential usages
for AuthSC, allowing further usages for authenticated
Smart Contracts.
4.1. Consortia Member Identification
Companies and other entities often opt for permis-
sioned settings concerning Blockchain systems: Either
they preselect nodes that are allowed to produce blocks
in the network (public permissioned Blockchains) or they
limit the accounts which are allowed to interact with a
given Smart Contract architecture [7]. Often, these enti-
ties (Smart Contracts or externally owned accounts) are
white-listed after an off-chain proof; usually, teams from
different companies communicate their account informa-
tion outside of the Blockchain network. However, this
process is expensive, as for every new connection trust
has to be established. To enhance this process, proofs
can be generated with AuthSC that endorse accounts
and Smart Contracts, allowing the ”administrative” party
to automatically add new entities to the network after
sufficient proof. This not only reduces costs but allows
for novel filtering, e.g., any domain with a TLD from e.g.,
Sweden is allowed to participate in the network. Proofs
can be stored in public permissionless Blockchains (e.g.,
the Ethereum Mainnet) and used in private Blockchains,
allowing an even further adoption of SSL/TLS-certificates
within these networks.
4.2. Information attribution and authentication
in public Blockchains
The properties of immutability, transparency, and
longevity of data and information are often used as ar-
guments for Blockchain technology, as many companies
value such properties for their use cases, e.g. reduce fraud
or increase transparency towards their users. Data stored
on Blockchains with the intention of transparency, how-
ever, lack the attribution or the connection to the company,
such that a proof that data comes from a company or
institution is bothersome, as prior communication is re-
quired as evidence. For these companies, it is much easier
to authenticate this Smart Contract, store their data in it,
and let other parties validate the stored data alongside au-
thenticating the Smart Contract. To give an example, this
approach could be used for allowing online-authentication
of digital certificates, e.g. degrees or references. Hashes of
such documents are stored on the Blockchain, similar to
other Blockchain-based approaches [8]. The authenticated
Smart Contract ensures the correctness of the identity of
the issuer. Third parties (e.g., potential employers) can
compare the hashes of received documents to the hashes
contained in the Smart Contract. This software addition-
ally authenticates the Smart Contract and validates the
asserted identity. With such a solution in place, software
can automatically scan if uploaded documents by the
applicant are valid or not.
5. Discussion
In this Section, we discuss the limitations and advan-
tages of our approach to better understand the implications
when using this artifact.
5.1. Limitations
To start with, this approach only supports the authenti-
cation of domain owners with certificates, e.g., businesses
or users with own websites, but not private persons or any
other parties without such certificates. This is a caveat,
as other parties, e.g., users, are also interested in having
authenticated addresses or Smart Contracts. Sending funds
to other parties or friends should involve some form of
authentication, unfortunately, our approach is not suitable
for this. Solving the issue for regular users would also
result in reduced onboarding costs if the authenticity
of the user is required, e.g., in financial transactions or
products. However, identity providers could use AuthSC
to authenticate their contracts to later assert identities to
their users, such that they can use authenticated addresses
later on with other service providers.
The AuthSC approach relies on SSL/TLS-certificates
issued by certificate authorities. The utilization of such
certificates implies that these institutions are trustworthy
and that limitations of this hierarchical public-key infras-
tructure also apply to AuthSC regards to centralization.
However, the transparent storage of signatures of Smart
Contract addresses can lead to increased trust in the
infrastructure, as outlined in Section 7. Furthermore, as
the basis of information is the web (which is deemed to
be trustworthy), we provide similar security.
Blockchain and Smart Contract technology is a grow-
ing area of business and research, and a lot of different
solutions compete for users, companies, and funds. At the
current stage of development, it is impossible to predict
which authentication or identity solution will prevail in the
long run and even if such technologies will have relevance
in the future at all, and this also applies for AuthSC.
However, if the usage of Blockchain technology increases,
such solutions will be required or even enable such usage
increase.
The system is designed such that different entities
can reach different conclusions about the validity of on-
chain data. Consequently, users verify data off-chain, not
resulting in absolute truth on-chain. It is possible to have
different perceptions of reality. Further, an entity may not
want to engage with another entity, even if it knows its
true identity.
Our presented approach requires rewriting existing
contracts to adhere to AuthSC’s interface, potentially im-
posing barriers to companies. Furthermore, access to the
SSL/TLS-certificate is required. Every company that uses
the AuthSC-approach has to follow the setup process,
incurring costs up-front. As many businesses rely on web
hosting companies, access might not be trivial, as leakage
of the certificate must be prevented.
5.2. Advantages
Our system uses, in contrast to all other approaches
outlined in Section 6, existing signature, and certificate au-
thority schemes. This has a two-fold benefit: First, there is
a straightforward onboarding process in place, as existing
structures are used. Entities do not have to go through
additional Know-Your-Customer-processes (KYC) to au-
thenticate their Smart Contract, it is inherently existent
if they own a domain with an SSL/TLS-certificate. No
entity is the gatekeeper of this approach and any entity
worldwide can immediately use this approach, enabling
a completely open system. Second, the system itself does
not need a bootstrapping process or the persuasion of other
entities to join and create the desired network-effect.
SSL/TLS-certificates are a passive form of authenti-
cation. A user requests a website and this website re-
turns the data with the respective certificate. The web
server cannot use its certificate in communication as the
initiating party, e.g., contacting another web server and
being authenticated by the TLS/SSL certificate. With our
approach, the SSL/TLS-certificates can be used actively,
as other Smart Contracts can allow for transactions from
such authenticated contracts, ensuring the authenticity of
their counterparty. This is a novelty for world-wide-web
based certificates.
Our system enables direct commercial relationships
between two businesses, worldwide, as until now there is
no way for companies to engage directly over Distributed
Ledger Technologies. Both parties can authenticate them-
selves with their public key and signature in their respec-
tive Smart Contract and signal the other party the willing-
ness to engage in further trade activities. Additionally, any
other party owning a domain and an SSL/TLS-certificate
such as governments, NGOs, or private persons can par-
ticipate in this scheme, allowing for an open ecosystem.
In some existing identity solutions, a central entity
defines the correctness of identities and their claims. This
results in a single point of failure. If the central entity
fails, the entire system is rendered useless or even worse,
is open to manipulating arbitrary data. In our approach, the
users can, if they want, decide on their own which entities
to trust, resulting in their perception of what information
is correct or not. Other users who are not familiar with the
system or technology can use the standard configuration,
resulting in a valid perception.
If a company using our approach implements a use
case familiar to the credential use case, the experience
of potential users visiting the website is similar to other
non-Blockchain websites. For the identification and the
authentication, no additional tools like MetaMask or other
wallet software are required, as every used technology
is already available in modern browsers. Therefore, the
complexity of the Blockchain and the implemented system
is abstracted from the user; if s/he is not interested in the
functionality of the system, chances are high that s/he will
not notice that the system is Blockchain-based.
The overall costs of our approach are low. Excluding
the costs of requesting a certificate, a company (or an en-
tity creating an authenticated contract) faces three primary
cost drivers:
• The deployment of the Smart Contract on the
Blockchain (required only once)
• The insertion/update of certificate material (only
required if the certificate changes)
• The usage of the actual intended Smart Contract
functionality (not covered in our calculation, as
these costs apply regardless of the authentication)
As the number of computational steps of each of the
first two processes depends on several parameters (e.g.,
domain length, enabled, or disabled compiler optimiza-
tion), costs cannot be determined precisely upfront. To
give a range, deploying an exemplary contract [3] uses
about 900,000 to 1 million Gas units. Currently (233 USD
/ Ether, 1st March 2020), ETHgasstation.info recommends
a Gas price of 8 GWei for fastest and 1 GWei as a
safe minimum for executing transactions. Selecting the
minimum price of 1 GWei as Gas price, the costs amount
to approximately 0.23 USD, a high price of 6 GWei
amounts to 1.86 USD for the first step. In the second
step, the insertion of key material takes about 10% of
the amount of Gas of the contract creation. In total, an
investment of less than 5 USD is sufficient to get started
with this approach, enabling a broad audience to use this
system. The detailed prices are depicted in Table 1.
TABLE 1. COSTS OF SMART CONTRACT INTERACTION
Deployment Key Material Insertion
Gas usage 1,000,000 Gas 120,000 Gas
Safe Low (1 GWei) 0.233 USD 0.028 USD
High Speed (8 GWei) 1.864 USD 0.224 USD
6. Related Work
In this Section, we outline concepts that partly overlap
with our research or try to solve similar issues. As our
approach lies within multiple domains, we categorize re-
lated work in three distinct categories: 1) verification and
validation of Ethereum addresses, 2) name services, and
3) decentralized identity or identity attribution systems.
6.1. Verification of Ethereum addresses
We focus on the verification of Ethereum addresses,
however, these approaches remain identical for addresses
of other Blockchains or public-key address schemes.
• Address Checksums: In EIP55, an address scheme
was introduced which capitalizes parts of the char-
acters in the address to allow for an easy verifyable
checksum [9]. It helps to prevent mistakes (e.g.,
left out characters) while copying the addresses.
It is often used inside wallets (e.g., MetaMask).
However, as an attacker can easily generate such
checksums as well or the tools used to generate
them automatically, the checksum does not help
the user to distinguish between valid and illicit
Smart Contracts.
• Vanity addresses: Vanity addresses are specially
crafted addresses to enable a partly readability.
For example, the author of Profanity, a tool
for producing these vanity addresses, has given
0x000dead000ae1c8e8ac27103e4ff65f42a4e9203
as donation address [10]. The software computes
private keys with a respective public key until
an address has been found which satisfies the
predefined requirements. Alternative approaches
include the usage of account nonces (specific to
Ethereum) to increase speed, however, the result
remains identical. An attacker is also able to
generate such an address with similar patterns;
given s/he has the computing power.
• Account address images: An approach used by
some wallets is blockies. Blockies is a library
that allows generating unique images of addresses,
called identicons [11]. These images should help
users to identify single addresses and better rec-
ognize if addresses have been swapped. However,
also this approach suffers from potential brute
force to recreate almost identical images, as work
by Austin Griffith shows [12].
• Multitude of address displayed: Some popular
tokens, such as Token-as-a-Service (TaaS), ap-
proached the problem by introducing redundancy
by displaying the address in multiple settings
(website, mail, and others) and formats (image,
text, and others) [13]. This approach increases
resilience against attacks, as attackers might not
able to change addresses in already sent emails.
However, it shifts the responsibility to the user.
S/he is responsible for the tiresome comparison
and verifying the correctness of the address. If the
user does not compare these addresses, an attack
could still be successful.
6.2. Name Services
Name services are systems that allow attributing
human-readable names to complex and changing informa-
tion, e.g., IP-addresses. This is a well-known approach and
is also the basis for today’s Domain name system [14], as
it maps (amongst other parameters) between FQDN and
IP-addresses.
• Ethereum Name Service (ENS): ENS is a well-
known service that allows the registration of do-
mains for the TLD .eth [15]. It started in 2018
and currently, over 700,000 domain auctions have
happened. Users bid for domains in a sealed auc-
tion and after a predefined time, the ownership
is transferred to the bidder with the highest offer.
The funds are locked for the time the domain is
registered. It can be refunded once the ownership
is abandoned. The approach is promising and finds
a lot of users within the Ethereum community,
however, the overall adoption is practically non-
existent. There is no judiciary system that allows
reassigning domain names, e.g., in cases of trade-
mark issues. Likely, popular domains registered in
ENS do not link to respective company accounts.
Further, the ”root zone” is managed by a multi-
signature wallet owned by seven single individu-
als.
• Other PKI-implementations: There is a series of
approaches trying to replicate public key infras-
tructures on Blockchains, creating such systems
from scratch. The key difference between these
approaches and ours is that we include preexist-
ing infrastructure in our approach, eliminating the
need for any bootstrapping. Out of brevity, we
do not cover single approaches but rather link to
already existing research conducted in [16], which
provides an overview of several implementations
and their key differences.
6.3. Decentralized Identity and Identity Attribu-
tion
Active research is conducted in the area of decen-
tralized identity, web of trust, and verifiable credentials.
W3C’s emerging standard on Decentralized Identifiers
(DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VC) receive a lot of
attention [17]. The basic idea is to enable credentials
independent from any third party, e.g. a website or a
provider (e.g. Login with Google) by storing a DID on
a distributed ledger. These ledgers (e.g. Ethereum) need
to provide methods to resolve such DIDs to DID doc-
uments which have additional information about cryp-
tographic mechanisms, keys, and verification endpoints.
The research focuses on standardizing interfaces required
for interacting with varying verification endpoints. These
systems primarily focus on enabling personal identity
without the requirement for a third party. In these systems,
Blockchain functions as a distributed immutable storage;
it is not intended to assign identities to Smart Contracts
or on-chain identities. Furthermore, DIDs lack widespread
adoption, and bootstrapping is required.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to use
established forms of certificate authorities and signature
schemes to allow for a secure binding between Smart
Contract-based Systems and the web. In comparison to
other approaches, our method does not depend on the
adoption rate or a network effect of the solution, as
SSL/TLS-certificates and the cryptographic mechanisms
are omnipresent and heavily used in todays world wide
web. The low costs and simplicity for the end-user
make the usage of SSL/TLS-certificates in the context of
Blockchain reasonable.
We identify three major directions of future work: risk
mitigation of using TLS/SSL-certificates, integration of
AuthSC into already existing identity management sys-
tems, and enabling on-chain identity.
As discussed in Section 5.1, AuthSC inherits already
existing drawbacks of the public key infrastructure, such
as revoked certificates, reissued certificates (by malicious
actors), or spoofing attacks with stolen keys. To resolve
such issues, they need to be addressed in the underlying
PKI. However, the increased transparency in the storage
can support algorithms in detecting abnormal issuance of
certificates or re-issuance of already trusted Smart Con-
tracts. Analog to attempts like Certificate Transparency
[18], transparency of AuthSC Smart Contracts (and thus
signatures) could enable heuristics to mitigate risks inher-
ited from the underlying layer.
The integration of this approach into already exist-
ing identity management systems like the upcoming De-
centralized Identifiers (DID) W3C standard [19] can be
promising. A DID-method specifically tailored to account
for SSL/TLS-certificates could help to reboot the Web of
Trust, as it would provide potential trust anchors without
the requirement for bootstrapping.
The on-chain authentication of identities should be
a significant direction of future research, as it enables
the full potential of this approach, allowing any use case
which involves on-chain computation to be implemented
and backed by this approach, enabling the usage of iden-
tity on-chain. It merely allows for binding between the
web and Smart Contracts, but further integrates TLS/SSL-
certificates as an identity provider into Smart Contract
systems. From our perspective, there are three potentials
of how such an approach can be facilitated:
1) Different types of certificates: The potential
forms of SSL/TLS-certificates are varying: EV-
certificates, wildcard certificates, or even multiple
certificates for a single domain require additional
analysis of the current certificate ecosystem to
enable the usage within AuthSC [20]. The usage
of TLS proxies especially present in enterprises
requires further consideration [21], further in-
valid, and malformed certificates and their impact
on security needs further consideration [22].
2) Enabling self-hosted oracles for validation of cer-
tificates: Each owner of a Smart Contract who
wants to identify other Smart Contracts defines
her/his oracle which is responsible for validating
certificates s/he wants to engage with. By self-
hosting such oracle, the entity can tremendously
reduce the costs in comparison to a full on-
chain authentication and define its own rules and
trusted CAs. This is a simple solution; however,
it induces the necessity of off-chain oracles.
3) Migration of existing CA structures to
Blockchain-based systems, such that all data is
stored safely and in a transparent manner on the
chain. If existing on-chain key mechanisms are
in place, such an approach could reduce the costs
of true on-chain authentication to a minimum,
enabling a truly trustless and widespread usage
worldwide.
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